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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________ 
 
MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 This case comes to us by way of a petition for writ of 
mandamus filed by the defendants Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
and Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (collectively, "Liberty 
Mutual").  Faced with Liberty Mutual's second notice of removal 
based on diversity jurisdiction, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted Plaintiff Ward 
Trucking Company's ("Ward") motion for remand without giving 
Liberty Mutual an opportunity to respond.  Liberty Mutual asserts 
that in doing so, the district court acted without authority, and 
asks for our review.  We are, therefore, once again required to 
address the parameters of a district court's statutorily defined 
power to remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and the scope of 
Congress' prohibition on appellate review of remand orders set 
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 
 
 I. 
 On May 11, 1993, Ward instituted a civil action by writ 
of summons in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
  
Pennsylvania against Liberty Mutual, its insurers.1  Thereafter, 
Ward filed a seven-count complaint in assumpsit and tort, 
asserting that Liberty Mutual mishandled claims, reserves and 
premiums under various insurance policies.  Paragraph 52 of the 
complaint stated that "the amount of damages resulting from the 
breach of duty and/or breach of contract are presently unknown 
. . .", and the addendum clause in six of the seven counts 
requested an unspecified amount in damages in excess of the 
jurisdictional limits of the Arbitration Division of the Court of 
Common Pleas, currently $25,000.  
 Count III of the complaint set forth a claim under 
Pennsylvania's Bad Faith Statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, which 
authorizes an action for an insurer's bad faith toward its 
insured and allows for an award of interest on the claim at issue 
in the amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus 3%, 
punitive damages and the assessment of attorneys fees.  Count 
III's addendum clause requested "an amount exceeding the 
jurisdictional limits of [the Court of Common Pleas], inclusive 
of interest equal to prime plus 3%, punitive damages, costs and 
attorneys fees."   
                     
1
.   The parties are engaged in two other lawsuits.  On May 
24, 1991, Ward commenced an equity action in the Court of Common 
Pleas of Blair County, Pennsylvania against Liberty Mutual, 
alleging breach of fiduciary and contractual duties, and seeking 
an accounting and a declaration of the amount of premiums, if 
any, Ward owes to Liberty Mutual.  This action has since been 
transferred to Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  On June 11, 1993, 
Liberty Mutual commenced an action against Ward in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
alleging that Ward failed to pay a past-due insurance premium. 
  
 On July 7, 1993, Liberty Mutual filed a notice of 
removal with the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, alleging federal diversity jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  While both the writ and the complaint, 
which were attached to the notice of removal, stated that Ward is 
a Pennsylvania citizen and Liberty Mutual is a citizen of 
Massachusetts, neither document showed that Ward's damages exceed 
$50,000, the amount in controversy requirement of federal 
diversity jurisdiction.  Consequently, in an attempt to establish 
this monetary threshold, Liberty Mutual attached counsel's 
affidavit to its removal notice, setting forth his personal 
belief that Ward's damages were greater than $50,000.  
 On July 19, 1993, Ward filed a motion to remand, which 
was subsequently amended on August 2, 1993, challenging, inter 
alia, Liberty Mutual's failure to show the requisite amount of 
damages for diversity jurisdiction.  On July 28, 1993, Liberty 
Mutual filed a response to Ward's original remand motion and on 
August 20, 1993, responded to Ward's amended motion.  On November 
3, 1993, the district court issued a memorandum opinion and 
order, granting Ward's amended motion to remand and returning the 
case to state court.  Citing to our decision in Foster v. Mutual 
Life Marine & Island Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1993),2 the 
                     
2
.   In Foster, after affirming a remand order which was 
based on the doctrines of abstention and comity, we took the 
opportunity to resolve the question as to when the thirty-day 
period for removal in the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) 
is triggered.  We decided that the time limit for removal is 
triggered when a writ of summons, praecipe or complaint provides 
adequate notice to the defendant of federal jurisdiction.  986 
F.2d at 54. 
  
district court rejected counsel's affidavit as evidence of Ward's 
damages, and held that because the writ and complaint included in 
Liberty Mutual's notice of removal did not establish the amount 
in controversy necessary to support federal jurisdiction, remand 
was in order. 
 In the course of subsequent discovery, Liberty Mutual 
obtained Ward's response to a document request which stated that 
Ward incurred $156,045.89 in attorneys fees arising out of its 
dispute with Liberty Mutual for the years 1987 to 1993.3  
 On April 6, 1994, Liberty Mutual filed a second notice 
of removal, attaching Ward's discovery response regarding 
attorneys fees for the purpose of establishing the required 
federal jurisdictional monetary amount.  On April 28, 1994, Ward 
followed with a motion to remand, asserting, inter alia, that 
Liberty Mutual's second removal notice failed to establish that 
Ward's damages exceed $50,000.  Without giving Liberty Mutual an 
opportunity to respond, the district court granted Ward's motion.  
In a memorandum opinion and order dated May 9, 1994, the district 
court again cited to Foster, 986 F.2d at 48, and concluded that 
Ward's discovery response could not be used to demonstrate the 
amount in controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction.  
Referring to its prior remand opinion, the district court found 
                     
3
.   By asking for the amount of fees Ward incurred over a 
number of years prior to the 1993 commencement of the Allegheny 
County, Pennsylvania, action, the discovery request apparently 
was not limited to this action.  In its brief, Ward clarifies 
that the $156,045.89 represents fees incurred in all three of the 
parties' lawsuits.  See n.1, supra. 
  
that Liberty Mutual's second removal suffered from the same 
deficiency as the first, and concluded that remand was required.  
Thus, the district court issued an order returning the case to 
the state Court of Common Pleas.  
 Liberty Mutual then filed a petition for writ of 
mandamus, requesting that we direct the district court to vacate 
the May 9, 1994 remand order; reinstate the case and permit 
Liberty Mutual an opportunity to respond to Ward's remand motion; 
and find that Ward's discovery response constitutes "other paper" 
under the second paragraph of section 1446(b) which may establish 
removability.  Ward, in turn, filed a motion for damages for 
frivolous appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38. 
 
 II. 
 The threshold question before us is whether we have 
jurisdiction to review the district court's remand order.  We 
must determine whether the district court's decision to remand 
which was made without giving Liberty Mutual the opportunity to 
respond to Ward's motion may be considered in light of the bar to 
appellate review of remand orders set forth in section 1447(d). 
 We turn first to the removal statutes, particularly the 
history of section 1447(d). 
  
 A. 
 Congress enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme for 
the removal of state court actions to federal court.  28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1441-1452.  Section 1441(a) provides in pertinent part:  
 
 Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act 
of Congress, any civil action brought in a 
State court of which the district courts of 
the United States have original jurisdiction, 
may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division 
embracing the place where such action is 
pending. 
 
 Section 1446 sets forth the procedure for removing a 
case to federal court, and section 1447 covers procedure after 
removal has occurred.  Section 1447(c) specifically provides for 
the remand of a case that has been removed under section 1446 and 
delineates two categories for removal:  (1) a "defect in the 
removal procedure" and (2) the absence of subject matter 
jurisdiction: 
   (c)  A motion to remand the case on the 
basis of any defect in removal procedure must 
be made within 30 days after the filing of 
the notice of removal under section 1446(a).  
If at any time before final judgment it 
appears that the district court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction, the case shall be 
remanded.  
 
 Section 1447(d), which speaks to the reviewability of 
remand orders, severely circumscribes our authority to review by 
providing that except for civil rights cases removed pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1443, "[a]n order remanding a case to the State court 
from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or 
  
otherwise. . . ."  By adopting section 1447(d) and its statutory 
predecessors, Congress sought to make the judgment of a district 
court remanding a case final and conclusive in order to avoid the 
delay caused by appellate review of remand decisions.  United 
States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1946).  In keeping with 
this policy, until 1976, section 1447(d) was construed to 
prohibit review of all remand orders without exception.  In re 
TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 832, 840 (3d Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992). 
 In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Thermtron Prod., 
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976).  There, the district 
court had remanded a case removed from state court on the basis 
of an overcrowded docket.  The plaintiffs sought a writ of 
mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
compelling the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
action.  The court of appeals denied the petition, relying on the 
bar to review in section 1447(d). 
 Reversing, the Supreme Court concluded that section 
1447(d) operates to preclude review of only those remand orders 
which rely on the grounds contained in the controlling statute, 
section 1447(c).  The Court held that sections 1447(c) and 
1447(d) must be read together and that "only remand orders issued 
under § 1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein . . . 
are immune from review under § 1447(d)."  Id. at 346.  
Acknowledging that it had declared an exception to the seemingly 
absolute prohibition to review in section 1447(d), the Court 
stated: 
  
  There is no doubt that in order to 
prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases 
by protracted litigation of jurisdictional 
issues, . . . Congress immunized from all 
forms of appellate review any remand order 
issued on the grounds specified in § 1447(c), 
whether or not that order might be deemed 
erroneous by an appellate court.  But we are 
not convinced that Congress ever intended to 
extend carte blanche authority to the 
district courts to revise the federal 
statutes governing removal by remanding cases 
on grounds that seem justifiable to them but 
which are not recognized by the controlling 
statute.  That justice may move more slowly 
in some federal courts than in their state 
counterparts is not one of the considerations 
that Congress has permitted the district 
courts to recognize in passing on remand 
issues.  Because the District Judge remanded 
a properly removed case on grounds that he 
had no authority to consider, he exceeded his 
statutorily defined power; and issuance of 
the writ of mandamus was not barred by § 
1447(d). 
 
Id. at 351 (citation omitted).  Further, the Court recognized 
that mandamus was the "appropriate remedy to require the District 
Court to entertain the remanded action."  Id. at 352. 
 One year later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue 
of section 1447(d)'s prohibition on appellate review of remand 
orders in Gravitt v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723 
(1977).  In Gravitt, the plaintiffs, some of whom were citizens 
of Texas, filed an action in a Texas state court.  After the 
plaintiffs dropped all claims against the only defendant alleged 
to be a Texas citizen, the remaining defendants removed the case 
to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  
Following extensive discovery and pretrial activity, the 
plaintiffs uncovered a pleading that one of the defendants, 
  
Southwestern Telephone Company, an allegedly Missouri citizen, 
had submitted in an unrelated state court proceeding.  In that 
pleading, Southwestern had averred that it was a Texas citizen.  
The plaintiffs filed a motion for remand, asserting that complete 
diversity did not exist.  Refusing to hear contrary evidence from 
Southwestern and citing to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the 
district court held that Southwestern was estopped to allege its 
Missouri citizenship as a basis for diversity jurisdiction, and 
granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand on the grounds that 
subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.  Southwestern commenced 
a mandamus proceeding to compel the district court to retain the 
case. 
 Concluding that a remand based on the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel was not contemplated by section 1447(c), the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Thermtron permitted review.  The court noted 
that the district court relied exclusively on the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel to grant the remand without examining whether 
Southwestern was a Texas citizen, and held that the doctrine 
could not be used to defeat Southwestern's statutory right to a 
federal forum.  Accordingly, the court issued a writ of mandamus 
ordering the district court to determine whether the parties were 
in fact diverse.  In a subsequent opinion, the panel determined 
that the district court was not required to inquire further into 
the diversity issue inasmuch as the plaintiffs did not challenge 
Southwestern's Missouri citizenship as a factual matter, but 
stood squarely on the estoppel theory as a matter of law to bar 
  
Southwestern from asserting diverse citizenship.  Sitting en 
banc, the court concluded that the use of doctrine of judicial 
estoppel was erroneous, and issued a writ of mandamus directing 
that the remand order be vacated. 
 In a tersely worded, two-page per curiam opinion, the 
Supreme Court reversed, not mentioning the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel.  Gravitt, 430 U.S. at 724.  The Court stated that 
"[t]he District Court's remand order was plainly within the 
bounds of § 1447(c) and hence was unreviewable by the Court of 
Appeals, by mandamus or otherwise", and re-emphasized the rule 
set down in Thermtron that remands issued pursuant to section 
1447(c) are not reviewable, "whether erroneous or not".  Id. at 
723; Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343. 
 B. 
 Since Thermtron and Gravitt, we have analyzed the 
prohibitive reach of section 1447(d) in a wide variety of 
circumstances.  At the outset, however, in order to address the 
specific reviewability issue presented here and determine which 
of our cases speak most clearly to the issue, we must decide the 
precise nature of the district court's May 9, 1994 remand order.  
While Ward characterizes the order as "jurisdictional", Liberty 
Mutual describes it as based on a "defect in removal procedure".  
In Liberty Mutual's view, the district court remanded under the 
first sentence of section 1447(c) merely because it objected to 
the discovery response Liberty Mutual attached to its notice of 
removal; not under section 1447(c)'s second sentence because it 
found that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking.  Liberty 
  
Mutual contends that the district court never grappled with the 
question of jurisdiction, pointing to the absence of a finding 
regarding the amount in controversy between the parties as proof 
of its position. 
 Since the district court found that Liberty Mutual's 
two removal notices were similarly deficient and incorporated the 
reasoning enunciated in its first opinion into its second 
opinion, we consider the court's November 3, 1993 and May 9, 1994 
opinions together to determine the basis for the court's May 9, 
1994 remand decision.  We initially observe that the court began 
its November 3, 1993 analysis by noting that the statute 
authorizing removal provides that an action is removable only if 
it could have initially been brought in a federal court and that 
the party desiring removal bears the burden of establishing the 
requirements of diversity jurisdiction.  The issue the district 
court confronted in each opinion was whether the papers that 
Liberty Mutual placed before it established the amount in 
controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction.  Despite 
Liberty Mutual's position to the contrary, the court found that 
Liberty Mutual's notices of removal did not show that Ward's 
damages exceed $50,000.  While it is true that the court refused 
to consider the information set forth in the discovery response 
attached to Liberty Ward's second removal notice in reaching its 
May 9, 1994 decision, the court did not remand because it 
concluded that Liberty Mutual violated one of the formalities 
related to the removal process by including an inappropriate 
document in the notice.  Rather, the court remanded because it 
  
concluded that Liberty Mutual failed to establish the threshold 
monetary amount essential to the court's jurisdiction.  We thus 
conclude that the court's May 9, 1994 remand order rested on 
jurisdictional grounds.  See Baris v. Sulpicio Lines Inc., 932 
F.2d 1540, 1544 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 112 S. Ct. 
430 (1991) ("As used in [section 1447(c)], a `procedural' defect 
is any defect that does not go to the question of whether the 
case originally could have been brought in federal district 
court. . .").4 
 C. 
 Having concluded that the district court's remand was 
jurisdictional, we turn for guidance to our cases which address 
the reviewability under section 1447(d) of a remand order based 
on a district court's determination that subject matter 
jurisdiction was lacking.  In In re TMI Litigation Cases 
Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S.___, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992), the plaintiffs commenced actions 
in a Pennsylvania state court for personal and economic injuries 
arising out of an incident at the Three Mile Island nuclear 
                     
4
.   In discussing the alternative grounds for remand set 
forth in section 1447(c), Professor Moore has explained that 
section 1447(c) "makes a distinction between formal defects in 
removal procedure . . . [and] lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction", and has noted that "[a] motion to remand [under 
the first sentence of section 1447(c)] must be made within 30 
days after removal, if the objections are of a character that can 
be waived, such as formal and modal matters pertaining to the 
procedure for removal or the non-removability of a proceeding 
otherwise within federal jurisdiction."  1A J. Moore & B. Ringle, 
Moore's Federal Practice § 0.168[4.-1] at 642, 644 (2d ed. 1993) 
(footnotes omitted). 
  
facility.  The defendants removed, asserting that since the 
plaintiffs' claims arose under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act 
of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., those claims must be tried in 
federal court.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for remand claiming 
that despite Congress' explicit statement to the contrary in the 
Act, their claims did not "arise under" federal law.  The 
district court remanded for lack of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The remand order was triggered by the court's 
holding that the Act, which contained the grant of federal 
jurisdiction upon which the defendants relied for removal, was 
itself unconstitutional.   
 In determining the threshold question concerning our 
jurisdiction, we reviewed the legislative and judicial history of 
section 1447(d) in great detail, and held that the remand order 
was subject to our review.  In doing so, we concluded that 
because "the jurisdictional determination of the district court, 
resting as it did upon the conclusion that the entire statutory 
scheme authorizing removal is unconstitutional, was not the type 
of federal subject matter jurisdiction decision intended to be 
governed by the terms of or the policy underlying section 
1447(c)", section 1447(d) had no application.  Id. at 845.  In 
other words, since the ruling which triggered the remand order 
was not the routine type of jurisdictional determination 
involving the presence of diversity or a federal question which 
Congress entrusted to the district courts, our review was not 
prohibited by section 1447(d).  Id. at 844. 
  
 Likewise, in Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, ___U. S.___, 114 S. Ct. 68 (1993), we analyzed the 
reach of section 1447(d) in connection with an order remanding a 
removed case to a state court on the grounds that federal 
jurisdiction was lacking.  There a defamation action had been 
filed in a Pennsylvania state court against five federal 
employees in their individual capacities.  After the case was 
removed to federal court under section 2679(d) of the Westfall 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., the United States Attorney for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, exercising the authority 
delegated by the Attorney General of the United States, certified 
that the five individual defendants were acting within the scope 
of their employment.  The United States was then substituted as 
the sole defendant.  The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand and 
a motion to strike the substitution of the United States, arguing 
that the individual defendants had not been acting within the 
scope of their employment when they allegedly made the defamatory 
comments.  After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court entered an order striking the substitution and remanding 
the case to the state court.  The United States filed a notice of 
appeal,5 as well as a petition for mandamus seeking review of the 
remand.   
                     
5
.   We concluded that the district court's order 
resubstituting the originally named defendants in place of the 
United States was reviewable by way of an appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  984 F.2d at 1352-54. 
  
 In deciding whether the remand order was reviewable, we 
initially analyzed the Westfall Act and its provisions regarding 
removal, and determined that when a tort suit is filed in a state 
court and the Attorney General certifies that the employee was 
acting within the scope of his employment and removes the case, 
the district court does not have authority to remand on the 
grounds that the Attorney General's certification was erroneous.  
Id. at 1356.  This determination was dictated by the terms of the 
Westfall Act which express Congress' intent that subject matter 
jurisdiction is conclusively established upon the Attorney 
General's certification.  Id.  We concluded that the district 
court exceeded its statutorily defined powers in section 1447(c) 
in remanding the case because there was no jurisdictional 
question before it, and held that section 1447(d) did not bar 
review.  Id. at 1357. 
 Before we decided the merits of the dispute, we noted, 
however, that this case stood in "marked contrast to the normal 
jurisdictional decisions made in connection with remand . . . 
thus . . . fall[ing] outside the types of cases section 1447(d) 
was intended to cover", and cautioned that "[i]t [did] not follow 
from our decision that anytime the district court misinterprets a 
jurisdictional statute we have the authority to review the remand 
decision . . . [since] [s]uch an exception would obviously 
swallow the rule."  Id.  Thus, our holding was limited to the 
"narrow situation where the district court has relied on a factor 
  
in its jurisdictional analysis that Congress intended to exclude 
from consideration of the jurisdictional issue."  Id.6 
 We again had the opportunity to examine the limits of 
section 1447(d) in connection with a jurisdictional remand order 
in Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 1994).  Carr 
had commenced a personal injury action in the state courts to 
recover damages from Red Cross and the Osteopathic Medical Center 
of Philadelphia arising out of an HIV-injected blood transfusion 
he received during an operation.  Red Cross invoked its federal 
charter and filed a notice of removal to the district court.  
Acting sua sponte, the district court remanded the case to the 
state court, rejecting Red Cross' contention that its charter 
automatically conferred federal jurisdiction over civil actions 
to which it is a party.  After remand, Carr filed an amended 
complaint.  In its answer, Osteopathic asserted a cross-claim for 
contribution and indemnity against Red Cross.  Following the 
Supreme Court's decision in American Nat. Red Cross v. S.G., ___ 
U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992), which held that the Red Cross 
charter confers jurisdiction over civil cases to which Red Cross 
is a party, Red Cross again removed the action to the district 
court.  Carr then filed a motion to dismiss Red Cross from the 
case and a motion for remand to the state court, asserting that 
                     
6
.   Guided by our decision in Aliota, we subsequently held 
in Powers v. Southland Corp. 4 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 1993), that 
section 1447(d) did not bar our review of a portion of a district 
court's jurisdictional remand order granting the plaintiff a 
relation back amendment because it was separate from and 
logically preceded the remand decision.  Id. at 226-30. 
  
the district court no longer had jurisdiction as a result of a 
joint tortfeasor release that Carr had given Red Cross.  The 
district court granted Carr's motions for dismissal and remand on 
the basis that once Red Cross entered into the release with Carr, 
federal subject matter jurisdiction no longer existed.  
Osteopathic filed an appeal7 and a petition for writ of mandamus 
directing the district court to vacate the remand order.   
 In considering whether section 1447(d) permitted our 
review, we cited our holdings in TMI Litigation and Aliota that 
section 1447(d) bars review of remand orders based on the routine 
jurisdictional determinations that Congress intends for the 
district courts to make.  Id. at 682.  Recognizing that we were 
presented with a "garden-variety, routine jurisdictional 
determination", we nonetheless expanded our remand reviewability 
principles and announced that "where a separable and final 
determination has been made by the district court, whether 
substantive or jurisdictional, which determination triggers 
remand, we will review both the underlying final order and the 
remand order itself."  Id. at 682-83.  Our decision to address 
the remand was based upon our serious concern that unless the 
remand order were reviewed, Osteopathic would not have been able 
to obtain review of the district court's preceding order of 
dismissal, and the state court would have been obligated to give 
                     
7
.   We concluded that the district court's order dismissing 
Red Cross was reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  17 F.3d at 675-
79. 
  
full faith and credit to the unappealed decision of the federal 
court.  Id. at 683. 
 
 III. 
 With the principles enunciated in Thermtron, Gravitt 
and our own cases interpreting the reach of section 1447(d) in 
mind, we turn to the remand order before us.  To determine 
whether we have the authority to review despite section 1447(d)'s 
prohibition, we consider two interrelated questions:  first, was 
the district court's order of the type that Congress intended to 
shield from appellate review under section 1447(d); and second, 
did the district court act consistently with its statutory 
authority defined in section 1447(c).   
 The district court's decision regarding Liberty 
Mutual's failure to establish the monetary amount essential to 
diversity jurisdiction is precisely the type of routine and 
regular jurisdictional decision that we determined in TMI and in 
Aliota Congress expected the district courts to make in removal 
cases and intended to insulate from challenge by enacting section 
1447(d).  Further, the district court's remand order was not made 
in the context of a separable and final determination, so that 
the addition to reviewability that we announced in Carr does not 
apply.  In our view, this case is most analogous to and 
controlled by Gravitt.  As in Gravitt, the district court here 
determined that a basic element of diversity jurisdiction was 
lacking, and issued a remand order that falls "plainly within the 
grounds of § 1447(c)".  430 U.S. at 723.  Therefore, under 
  
Thermtron, the court's order is shielded from review by section 
1447(d).  423 U.S. at 336.  See Bregman v. Alderman, 955 F.2d 660 
(11th Cir. 1992) (even where the district court's remand order 
was issued without a finding as to whether diversity of 
citizenship in fact existed and could have been mistaken, 
appellate review was barred by section 1447(c) since the order 
was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not a defect 
in removal procedures). 
 
 IV. 
 Additionally, we conclude that section 1447(c) 
authorizes the district court to remand as it did, without 
affording Liberty Mutual an opportunity to respond to Ward's 
motion.  As we must, we start with the plain language of the 
statute -- "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears 
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 
case shall be remanded" -- and note that it allows and indeed 
compels a district court to address the question of jurisdiction, 
even if the parties do not raise the issue.  Moreover, the 
general rule that federal courts have an ever-present obligation 
to satisfy themselves of their subject matter jurisdiction and to 
decide the issue sua sponte applies equally in removal cases.  
Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 
1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 (1988).  
See also American Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Nyacol Products, 
Inc., 989 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
___U.S.___, 114 S. Ct. 682 (1994); Ziegler v Champion Mortg. Co., 
  
913 F.2d 228, 229 (5th Cir. 1990).  Thus, since a motion and 
response are not required (i.e., are not the basis) for 
jurisdictional remand orders under section 1447(c), the district 
court did not exceed its statutory authority by not waiting for a 
response from Liberty Mutual.  Stated alternatively, the absence 
of Liberty Mutual's response did not deprive the district court 
of its statutory power to remand once it determined that subject 
matter jurisdiction was lacking.   
          In support of reviewability, however, Liberty Mutual 
contends that the district court exceeded its section 1447(c) 
authority by breaching rules of fundamental fairness in not 
permitting it to respond.  Assuming arguendo that the process by 
which the district court remanded was unfair and also violative 
of established legal principles, it does not follow that Liberty 
Mutual's argument prevails, for it essentially equates error with 
unauthorized action.  Were this so, then every erroneous remand 
decision would be reviewable, and section 1447(d) would have no 
meaning.  If Thermtron and Gravitt teach nothing else, they 
instruct that when a district court exercises its power to remand 
under section 1447(c), section 1447(d) allows a district court to 
err; it necessarily follows that section 1447(d) also allows a 
district court to be procedurally unfair.  Just as section 
1447(d) prohibits our review of the merits of a remand order that 
falls within the parameters of section 1447(c), it prohibits our 
review of the manner by which such an order was rendered.   
 Furthermore, our decision is in keeping with the policy 
of minimizing delay which underlies the section 1447(d) bar to 
  
review.  If, despite section 1447(d)'s prohibition, parties 
opposing remand are permitted to invoke appellate review upon 
claims of a district court's unfairness, the potential for 
disruption and delay, which Congress sought to minimize by 
enacting section 1447(d), would be far-reaching. 
 Thus, we hold that review of the district court's 
remand order in this case is barred by section 1447(d).  No 
matter how faulty we might consider the district court's 
reasoning or methods, section 1447(d) prohibits us from reviewing 
an action the district court was empowered to take, and one that 
Congress intended to be final.  The dissent correctly points out 
that our opinion does not require a district court to grant a 
motion for remand on jurisdictional grounds without waiting for a 
response; and indeed, our decision should not be read as an 
imprimatur on the district court's actions.  This is a matter of 
applying Congress' intent in enacting the removal statutes, and 
it is here where we and the dissent part ways. Accordingly, 
having determined that we do not have jurisdiction to review, we 
will not address the substance of the questions presented in 
Liberty Mutual's petition.   
 V. 
 Ward requests that we impose damages under Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 38 against Liberty Mutual for having filed 
the petition for writ of mandamus.  Ward characterizes the 
petition as frivolous and asserts that the issue Liberty Mutual 
raises is completely lacking in merit .   
Rule 38 states: 
  
 Damages for Delay 
  If a Court of Appeals shall determine 
that an appeal is frivolous, it may award 
just damages and single or double costs to 
the appellee. 
 
Fed. R. App. P. 38. 
 We employ an objective standard in determining whether 
an appeal is frivolous.  Hilmon Co. (V.I.) v. Hyatt Int'l, 899 
F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 1990).  We impose damages under Rule 38 
only when an appeal is frivolous.  Mellon Bank Corp. v. First 
Union Real Estate Equity and Mortg., 951 F.2d 1399, 1413 (3d Cir. 
1991).  We find that Liberty Mutual raised a novel question in 
its petition regarding the parameters of sections 1447(c) and 
1447(d), and presented a meritorious argument in favor of 
reviewability.  Thus, we will not impose Rule 38 damages against 
Liberty Mutual. 
 
 VI. 
 Because we do not have jurisdiction to review under 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(d), we will dismiss Liberty Mutual's petition for 
writ of mandamus.  Having determined that Liberty Mutual's 
petition was not frivolous, we will deny Ward's motion for 
damages pursuant to Fed. R. App. P 38. 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. & Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Ward 
Trucking Corp. & The Hon. Gustave Diamond, No. 94-3377 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 Nothing is more central to the regime of federal civil 
procedure than the principle of notice and opportunity to be 
heard.  This appeal is from an order of the district court that 
granted defendant's motion to remand a removed case back to the 
state court on the ground that the plaintiff had not demonstrated 
sufficient damages to support subject matter jurisdiction, 
without affording plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be 
heard, even by a simple letter memorandum, on the question 
whether a dispute existed as to the existence of jurisdictional 
amount.8  The majority blesses this procedure.  I cannot. 
 Section 1447(c) authorizes such remand where "it 
appears that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction."  I do not see how a deficiency can "appear" unless 
the party opposing the remand can say at least something about 
the matter, and hence I read section 1447(c) as requiring at 
least minimal notice and opportunity to be heard.  In my view, 
the majority's crabbed and rigid reading of section 1447(c), 
which gives rise to an egregious departure from bedrock 
principle, is unsustainable.  The majority's defensive statement 
that section 1447(d) also "allows a district court to be 
                     
8
.  I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that the 
remand order at issue here was "jurisdictional," rather than one 
based on a "defect in removal procedure."  Maj. Op. at 13. 
  
procedurally unfair," Maj. Op. at 21, is as startling as it is 
distressing. 
 Nor do I think that we would violate section 1447(d) by 
reviewing this remand order.  Our opinion in Air-Shields, Inc. v. 
Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989), holds that when the district 
court does not comply with the requisites of section 1447(c), 
section 1447(d) does not shelter a remand order from review.  If, 
as I believe, section 1447(c) requires an opportunity to respond 
before remand may be ordered, then that is as much one of "the 
parameters of a district court's statutorily defined power to 
remand under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)," Maj. Op. at 2, as the holding 
of Air-Shields that sua sponte remands cannot be ordered after 
the 30 day time limit.  In short, I cannot conceive that either 
the district court's admittedly broad remand power under section 
1447(c) or the delay avoidance policy of section 1447(d) renders 
a district court's ex parte determination that it lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction, made without notice or opportunity to be 
heard, inviolate and unreviewable.  This is especially so in a 
case such as this where the district court is remanding for the 
second time. 
 Because the district court did not offer notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, even minimally, it acted in excess of 
its authority in entering the remand order, and as a result, 
section 1447(d) does not bar review thereof.9  I would therefore 
                     
9
.  The majority opinion makes much of Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 
1350 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 68 (1993), and Carr v. 
  
grant Liberty Mutual's petition for writ of mandamus and direct 
the district court to allow Liberty Mutual to respond to Ward 
Trucking's remand motion before ruling upon it.  These views are 
informed not merely by my sense of the fundaments of our judicial 
polity, but also by a venerable history, with which I begin. 
I.  § 1447(c) AND THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE AND 
 OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD 
 A.  Origins of the Statutory Remand Power 
 The remand power currently embodied in section 1447(c) 
originally required district courts in all cases to give the 
affected parties notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
remanding for a lack of jurisdiction.   Section 1447(c) had its 
genesis in the Judiciary Act of 1875.  Section 5 of the Act 
provided: 
 That if, in any suit commenced in a circuit court or 
removed from a State court to a circuit court of the 
United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of 
said circuit court, at any time after such suit has 
been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does 
not really and substantially involve a dispute or 
controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said 
circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have 
(..continued) 
American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671 (3d Cir. 1994).  The discussion 
of these cases, however, is besides the point.  No one argues 
that the remand order at issue here was was anything but a 
jurisdictional remand based on a non-constitutional, non-
severable determination that the requisite amount in controversy 
had not been established.  The real question is whether the 
district court entered its remand order in a manner authorized by 
section 1447(c), in which case the reviewability bar of section 
1447(d) applies, or whether the district court exceeded its 
authority by remanding without first offering to Liberty Mutual 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, in which case we may 
review the remand order.  Thus, Air-Shields is the controlling 
precedent, as explained infra Part II. 
  
been improperly or collusively made or joined, either 
as plaintiffs or defendants, for the purpose of 
creating a case cognizable or removable under this act, 
the said circuit court shall proceed no further 
therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the 
court from which it was removed as justice may require, 
and shall take such order as to costs as shall be just; 
but the order of said circuit court dismissing or 
remanding said cause to the State Court shall be 
reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ or error or 
appeal, as the case may be. 
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 472 (emphasis 
supplied).  At that time circuit courts were federal trial 
courts, and so, under this act, the trial court was directed to 
remand an action if, inter alia, "it shall appear to [its] 
satisfaction . . . that such suit does not really and 
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within 
the jurisdiction of" the court.10 
 That this provision should be interpreted as containing 
a requirement that the trial court hear from the affected parties 
before remanding is shown by the Supreme Court's opinion in 
Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 9 S. Ct. 289 (1889).  That case 
involved an appeal from the circuit court for the Middle District 
of Alabama.  The plaintiff, a recent Alabama citizen and resident 
claiming to be a Tennessee citizen, had filed suit against 
defendants who were citizens of Alabama.  The defendants moved to 
dismiss, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the 
                     
10
.  The court might also dismiss, since this provision governed 
both removed actions and ones originally filed in the circuit 
courts. 
  
plaintiff was actually an Alabama citizen.  After considering 
affidavit and deposition testimony, "and after argument by 
counsel for the respective parties," the court denied the motion.  
Id. at 321, 9 S. Ct. at 291 (emphasis supplied).  When the 
plaintiff prevailed on final judgment, the defendants appealed. 
 Not reaching other, substantive questions presented by 
the appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court 
should have dismissed the case under section five of the 
Judiciary Act of 1875.  Id. at 324-25, 9 S. Ct. at 292.  The 
court explained that if the plaintiff had not changed his state 
of citizenship to Tennessee, the circuit court was obliged to 
dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction.  Interpreting the 
statute, the Court explained that 
 this duty arose only when it appeared to the 
satisfaction of the court that the suit was not one 
within its jurisdiction.  But if the record discloses a 
controversy of which the court cannot properly take 
cognizance, its duty is to proceed no further, and to 
dismiss the suit; and its failure or refusal to do 
what, under the law applicable to the facts proved, it 
ought to do, is an error . . . . 
Id. at 325, 9 S. Ct. at 292.  This duty comes into play whenever 
the court determines that jurisdiction is lacking, for "the court 
is bound to ask and answer [the jurisdictional question] for 
itself, even when not otherwise suggested," id. at 326, 9 S. Ct. 
at 292 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 
379, 382, 4 S. Ct. 510, 511 (1884)).  Moreover, and more to the 
point, 
 the statute does not prescribe any particular mode in 
which such fact [the lack of jurisdiction] may be 
  
brought to the attention of the court.  It may be done 
by affidavits, or the depositions taken in the cause 
may be used for that purpose.  However done, it should 
be upon due notice to the parties affected by the 
dismissal. 
Id. (emphases supplied). 
  Thus, although the Supreme Court concluded that lack 
of jurisdiction was manifest from the record before the circuit 
court, and hence that the court erroneously failed to dismiss the 
case in compliance with the substance of section five, id. at 
328-29, 9 S. Ct. at 293, the Court was nonetheless satisfied that 
the circuit court had complied with section five's procedural 
strictures: 
 In the case before us the question [of subject matter 
jurisdiction] was formally raised, during the progress 
of the cause, by written motion, of which the plaintiff 
had due notice, and to which he appeared and objected.  
So that there can be no question as to any want of 
opportunity for him to be heard, and to produce 
evidence in opposition to the motion to dismiss. 
Id. at 327-28, 9 S. Ct. at 293 (emphases supplied). 
 The court distinguished this case from Hartog v. 
Memory, 116 U.S. 588, 6 S. Ct. 521 (1886).  There, although the 
complaint properly alleged diversity jurisdiction, the defendant 
did not challenge the citizenship allegations until after 
receiving an unfavorable verdict.  The Supreme Court said that 
 if, from any source, the court is led to suspect that 
its jurisdiction has been imposed upon by the collusion 
of the parties or in any other way, it may at once of 
its own motion cause the necessary inquiry to be made, 
either by having the proper issue joined and tried, or 
by some other appropriate form of proceeding, and act 
as justice may require for its own protection against 
fraud or imposition . . . . 
  
Id. at 591, 6 S. Ct. at 522 (quoted in Morris, 129 U.S. at 327, 9 
S. Ct. at 292-93) (emphases supplied).  The Morris Court 
contrasted the actions of the circuit court in its case with 
those of the trial court in Hartog, which had 
 summarily dismissed the action, upon the ground solely 
of want of jurisdiction, without affording the 
plaintiff any opportunity whatever to rebut or control 
the evidence upon the question of jurisdiction. 
Morris, 129 U.S. at 327, 9 S. Ct. at 293 (emphasis supplied).  
The trial court's failure to give the plaintiff an opportunity to 
be heard before dismissing for lack of jurisdiction was enough to 
warrant the Supreme Court's reversing the order of dismissal and 
remanding for further proceedings.  Id.  Thus, the Supreme Court 
read section five as requiring that the trial court provide the 
affected parties with notice of its intent to remand, i.e., to 
rule on the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, as well as 
an opportunity to be heard. 
  
 B.  Evolution of Section 1447(c) 
 Nothing in the subsequent evolution of section 1447(c) 
from section five of the Judiciary Act of 1875 forward 
demonstrates an intent to abrogate the salutary restriction 
described above, i.e., that the (original) statutory power of the 
federal trial courts to remand for lack of jurisdiction required 
that remand orders be entered only after giving the affected 
parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.  The following 
discussion of the evolution of section 1447(c) does not, for the 
most part, treat the companion development of the bar on 
appellate review of remand orders now expressed in 28 U.S.C. 
1447(d), for the point of the discussion is to show that section 
1447(c) should be held to require district courts to give notice 
and an opportunity to be heard to the parties before remanding a 
removed case.  Once that is demonstrated, section 1447(d) ceases 
to be a problem because that section does not bar review of an 
order entered in excess of the district court's authority. 
 Section five was modified by the Judiciary Act of 1887, 
which repealed the provision allowing review of remand orders "on 
writ or error or appeal."  See Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 
§§ 2, 6, 24 Stat. 552.  The provision authorizing remand for lack 
of jurisdiction, however, was unaffected by the 1887 act (or by 
the 1888 act correcting errors in the enrollment of the 1887 act, 
Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433).  State of Minnesota 
v. Northern Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 65, 24 S. Ct. 598, 602 (1904); 
  
Waite v. City of Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, 325, 22 S. Ct. 327, 
335 (1902). 
 In 1911, Congress codified the Judicial Code.  Act of 
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.  Aside from not 
resurrecting the repealed reviewability provision, the 1911 act 
re-enacted section five's remand provision almost verbatim.  Act 
of March 3, ch. 231, § 37, 36 Stat. 1098.  Thus, the 1911 Code 
displays no intent to eliminate the notice-and-hearing 
requirement. 
 The 1948 re-codification of the Judicial Code and the 
1949 corrections thereto produced the remand provision's next 
change in form.  See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1447, 62 
Stat. 869, 939, amended, Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 
Stat. 89, 102.  As a result of these changes, the new 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c) read (with emphasis supplied): 
 If at any time before final judgment it appears that 
the case was removed improvidently and without 
jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, 
and may order the payment of costs. 
Again, as the Supreme Court has explained, the change from the 
1911 Judicial Code to section 1447 was "no[t] inten[ded] to 
change the prior law substantively," but was meant "to recodify 
the pre-1948 law without material change insofar as the 
provisions of §§ 71 and 80 of the old Code here relevant were 
  
concerned."  Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 350 n.15, 96 S. Ct. at 592 
n.15.11 
 Moreover, the "it appears" language carried through the 
re-codification, albeit with minor modification:  the statute 
dropped the modifier "to the satisfaction of the district court" 
(and switched from the future to the present tense).  The 
elimination of court-centered language from the requirement that 
the lack of jurisdiction "appear" moves in the opposite direction 
of what one would expect if Congress intended to delete a 
requirement that courts give parties notice and an opportunity to 
be heard before remanding cases for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Thus, the requirement, still in effect in the 
Judicial Code of 1911, survived re-codification in 1948. 
 The current version of section 1447(c), 
 A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect 
in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after 
the filing of the notice of removal under section 
1446(a).  If at any time before final judgment it 
appears that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (1994), results from one of many amendments 
to the Judicial Code made by Congress in 1988.  See Judicial 
                     
11
.  Although the dissent in Thermtron was less sanguine than the 
majority that no change was intended by the 1948 re-codification, 
see Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 359-60, 96 S. Ct. at 597 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting), it offered no evidence of the type of "changes 
in substance" that were intended, id. at 360, 96 S. Ct. at 597, 
and at all events, the language relevant here -- the intact 
provision that the lack of jurisdiction shall "appear" -- 
remained.  See infra. 
  
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, 
102 Stat. 4642.  The two sentences of this version of section 
1447(c) were produced by splitting up the sole sentence of the 
pre-amendment provision.  In doing so, Congress replaced the two 
prior authorized remand grounds -- if a case was removed 
"improvidently," or if a case was removed "without jurisdiction" 
-- with, respectively, a sentence authorizing remands of cases 
for a "defect in removal procedure" and one authorizing remands 
for a "lack[ of] subject matter jurisdiction."  See Rothner v. 
City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1411 & n.7 (7th Cir. 1989).  The 
scanty legislative history of this change (a mere two 
paragraphs), see H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033; see also 134 
CONG. REC. S16284, S16308 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988); Court Reform 
and Access to Justice Act:  Hearings on H.R. 3152 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of 
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st & 
2d Sess. 97-98 (1987-1988), reveals no intent to change the 
requirements for district court remands, other than to require 
that motions for remands for removal procedure defects be made 
within thirty days of removal.  Importantly, the statute retained 
(without change) the operative phrase, "it appears." 
 C.  Consistency with Judicial Policy 
 As the foregoing analysis shows, section 1447(c) 
requires the district court to give the affected parties notice 
  
and an opportunity to be heard before remanding a case.  This 
makes sense, for subject matter jurisdiction -- although a 
threshold issue -- is not something fit for judicial notice, and 
the law and facts of a given case must generally be determined, 
in our adversary system, by the court, after hearing from the 
interested parties.12 
 More specifically, district courts are obligated to 
listen to the affected parties before dismissing a case for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  We have explained this in 
Neiderhiser v. Borough of Berwick, 840 F.2d 213, 216 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1988).  There, the district court had dismissed the plaintiff's 
action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it 
concluded, sua sponte, that the suit did not present a live case 
or controversy.  Id. at 216.  The fact that the district court 
                     
12
.  The majority's invocation of cases where the court sua 
sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is not to 
the contrary.  The practice at least of this Circuit is to allow 
the parties the opportunity to be heard even when sua sponte 
raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.  See, e.g., 
Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 69 (3d Cir. 1989); Knop v. 
McMahan, 872 F.2d 1132, 113 (3d Cir. 1989); Lovell Mfg. v. 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, 843 F.2d 725, 729 (3d 
Cir. 1988); Lewis v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 
771, 826 F.2d 1310, 1312 (3d Cir. 1987); Kiick v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 784 F.2d 490, 492 (3d Cir. 1986); Stibitz v. General 
Pub. Utilities Corp., 746 F.2d 993, 995 (3d Cir. 1984); Local 
Union 334, United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of Plumbing 
and Pipe Fitting Indus. of U.S. and Canada, AFL-CIO, 628 F.2d 
812, 813 (3d Cir. 1980); Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 
957, 958 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1980); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. 
v. Local Unions 327, 749, 1289, 1298, 1303, 1309 and 1314 of 
Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 508 F.2d 687, 698 n.30 (3d 
Cir. 1975). 
  
sua sponte considered dismissal was not a problem in itself, but 
the procedure used was impermissible: 
 While the district court's consideration of the 
jurisdictional issue sua sponte was proper, the court 
did not afford the parties the opportunity to brief or 
present evidence on this issue.  We find this lack of 
opportunity to be heard improper.  The court below 
should have allowed [the plaintiff] sufficient time to 
present evidence or otherwise respond on the issue of 
jurisdiction before it determined that none existed. 
Id. at 216 n.6 (emphases supplied).  We did not need to remand 
there only because -- on the extant record -- we ruled in favor 
of the plaintiff, holding that subject matter jurisdiction 
existed. 
 As a general matter, the district court is required to 
give parties notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
remanding a removed case.  See Local 336, American Federation of 
Musicians, AFL-CIO v. Bonatz, 475 F.2d 433, 437 (3d Cir. 1973) 
("Even on [issues of jurisdictional fact] the record must clearly 
establish that after jurisdiction was challenged the plaintiff 
had an opportunity to present facts by affidavit or by 
deposition, or in an evidentiary hearing, in support of his 
jurisdictional contention.") (emphasis supplied); Prakash v. 
American Univ., 727 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("When 
subject matter jurisdiction is questioned, the court must, of 
course, satisfy itself of its authority to hear the case, and in 
so doing, it may resolve factual disputes.  The court has 
considerable latitude in devising the procedures it will follow 
to ferret out the facts pertinent to jurisdiction, and normally 
  
it may rely upon either written or oral evidence.  The court 
must, however, afford the nonmoving party `an ample opportunity 
to secure and present evidence relevant to the existence of 
jurisdiction.'") (quoting Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 
675 F.2d 356, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Spotswood W. Robinson, III, 
C.J., concurring)). 
 While these cases go to jurisdictional facts, I do not 
see why their reasoning is not also applicable to "jurisdictional 
law."  Indeed, in the instant case, Liberty Mutual contends that 
the district court adopted verbatim Ward Trucking's mistaken view 
of the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) for establishing 
amount in controversy, and that this error led the district court 
incorrectly to conclude that the plaintiff could not use 
discovery responses to support removal.  In Liberty Mutual's 
submission, the district court's confusion as to jurisdictional 
law led the court to conclude incorrectly that Liberty Mutual had 
not shown a jurisdictional fact, i.e., an amount in controversy 
in excess of $50,000.  See discussion in the margin.13 
                     
13
.  Although the majority opinion refers generally to the basis 
for the district court's remand order, it paints an incomplete 
picture.  The majority notes that the district court entered its 
first remand order because Ward Trucking's state court complaint 
and writ failed to show a sufficient amount in controversy, and 
because the affidavit of Liberty Mutual's counsel, in which he 
opined that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000, was 
legally insufficient.  And, as the majority explains, the 
district court remanded the second time after it refused to 
consider the discovery responses that had since been submitted by 
Liberty Mutual in support of removal.  Despite the fact that 
Liberty Mutual thus presented admissions of the plaintiff, and 
  
 These views are strongly supported by the discussion in 
In re Continental Casualty Co., 29 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1994), 
(..continued) 
not merely a statement of its own counsel's views, the majority 
simply states: 
 
 The issue the district court confronted in each opinion 
was whether the papers that Liberty Mutual placed 
before it established the amount in controversy 
requirement of diversity jurisdiction. 
 
Maj. Op. at 12.  This characterization of the issues is 
incomplete. 
 Under the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), the 
issue in the first removal and remand was whether the "initial 
pleadings" filed by the defendant in the state court action 
established that suit could have been brought in federal court.  
See Foster v. Mutual Life Marine & Island Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 48, 
54 (3d Cir. 1993) cited in Maj. Op. at 4 n.2.  However, under the 
second paragraph of section 1446(b), the issue in the second 
removal and remand was whether Liberty Mutual had presented the 
district court with "other paper" that showed an adequate amount 
in controversy.  Foster resolved only the question of what 
constituted "pleadings" and did not define "other paper"; indeed, 
several reported decisions, including one from the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, hold that discovery responses may 
constitute "other paper" that can establish amount in controversy 
under section 1446(b).  See, e.g., Zawacki v. Penpac, Inc., 745 
F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (deposition testimony).  But 
Ward Trucking cited none of these cases to the district court, 
instead using the Foster definition of pleadings to argue in its 
remand motion that the discovery responses were inadmissible for 
amount in controversy purposes.  Without even asking whether 
Liberty Mutual disagreed with that construction of section 
1446(b) (at which time Liberty Mutual could have called these 
other cases to the court's attention for consideration), the 
district court entered a remand order that word for word adopted 
Ward Trucking's interpretation of Foster and section 1446(b). 
 I do not, of course, opine as to whether Liberty Mutual 
or Ward Trucking correctly interpreted section 1446(b).  My 
discussion is meant solely to illustrate the dangers inherent in 
the majority's interpretation of section 1447(c) as authorizing 
district courts to remand without giving the parties notice and 
an opportunity to be heard. 
  
where the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
section 1447(c) does not authorize district courts to remand 
cases for procedural defects absent a motion by a party.  In so 
concluding, the court stressed the importance of hearing from the 
affected parties: 
 By acting without any motion, district judges increase 
the risk of error--both legal error and error in 
understanding the parties' desires.  Ours is an 
adversarial system, and courts rely on lawyers to 
identify the pertinent facts and law.  In this case the 
district judge stated the facts correctly but 
apparently was unaware of cases that had discussed the 
issue and reached conclusions at odds with his own.  
Perhaps these other cases are incorrect;  we have no 
views on the subject.  But the district court should 
have solicited the parties' submissions before acting, 
to avoid what has happened in this case--extended 
disputation,  potentially leading to another change of 
forum.  If the district judge should entertain the 
parties' views before remanding a case, then he also 
ought to wait for a motion . . . . 
Id. at 295 (citation omitted).  Because the court of appeals 
required the district court to hear from the parties before 
remanding, it concluded that the district court could not sua 
sponte remand on the grounds of procedural defect.  See id.  
Although the plaintiff's ability to waive procedural defects 
supported the court's conclusion that district courts must await 
a party's motion before remanding for procedural defects, id., 
the independent requirement that district courts must "solicit 
the views of the parties" flowed from the more general concerns 
  
about risks of error in light of the nature of our adversarial 
court system.14 
                     
14
.  The construction of 1447(c) described above also accords 
with the sound practice of many of our district court judges.  
See, e.g., Allergy Diagnostics Lab. v. The Equitable, 785 
F. Supp. 523, 524 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (addressing arguments made by 
removing defendant "upon the court's raising the jurisdictional 
issue at a status conference"); McDonough v. Blue Cross of N.E. 
Penn., 131 F.R.D. 467, 470-72 (W.D.Pa. 1990) (remanding only 
after addressing and rejecting defendants contentions in support 
of jurisdiction); Mall v. Atlantic Fin. Federal, 127 F.R.D. 107, 
108-09 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (although neither plaintiff nor defendants 
moved for remand, both plaintiff and one defendant questioned the 
court's jurisdiction); id. at 110 (defendant opposing remand 
filed supplemental brief arguing for jurisdiction); Recchion v. 
Kirby, 637 F. Supp. 290, 291 (W.D. Pa. 1986) ("[The district 
court] sua sponte addressed the propriety of removal . . . and 
the basis for . . . subject matter jurisdiction and ordered the 
parties to file briefs on the issue."). 
  
 D.  Consistency with Congressional Policy 
 This construction of section 1447(c) accords with the 
policy underlying section 1447.  Certainly, in curtailing review 
of remands issued for lack of jurisdiction, Congress did seek "to 
make the judgment of a district court remanding a case final and 
conclusive in order to avoid the delay caused by appellate review 
of remand decisions."  Maj. Op. at 7 (emphasis supplied).  But by 
concluding that the risk of erroneous remand orders was not great 
enough to outweigh the threat posed by protracted litigation over 
jurisdictional questions, Congress must have presupposed the 
exercise of judgment.  Cf. Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199, 
201, 204, 61 S. Ct. 213, 215-16 (1940) (where, on plaintiff's 
remand motion, district court took evidence before deciding to 
grant remand, remand was unreviewable, for the remand statutes 
"entrust determination concerning such matter to the informed 
judicial discretion of the district court") (emphasis supplied).  
That expectation would conform with my view that section 1447(c) 
requires the district court to afford the affected parties notice 
and opportunity to be heard before it remands cases to state 
court. 
 The assumption that district courts arrive at reasoned 
remand decisions, unlikely to be wrong, also underlies the 
decision of In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 
832 (3d Cir. 1991), and supports my conclusions here.  As the 
majority relates, that case held that section 1447(d) did not bar 
  
review of a district court's remand order that was based on the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction flowing from the district 
court's determination that the act giving rise to federal 
question jurisdiction was itself unconstitutional.  Maj. Op. at 
13-14.  How was this court able to review the remand order, 
"plainly within the bounds of § 1447(c)," Gravitt, 430 U.S. at 
723, without offending section 1447(d)?  Because we concluded 
that "the jurisdictional determination of the district court 
. . . was not the type of federal subject matter jurisdiction 
decision intended to be governed by the terms of or the policy 
underlying section 1447(c)."  Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting TMI 
Litigation, 940 F.2d at 845) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
As the majority here explains, "the ruling which triggered the 
remand order was not the routine type of jurisdictional 
determination . . . which Congress entrusted to the district 
courts[.]"  Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 TMI Litigation might be distinguished on the grounds 
that it involved a distinction among the subject matters of 
district court determinations, rather than the procedures, but it 
supports my view that Congress did not expect district courts to 
accept verbatim a moving party's statement of the law without 
listening to the opposing party's views, for that is not a 
"routine" method of making judicial decisions.  Given that judges 
are human, a court that would rule without listening is 
appreciably more likely to err than one that considers both 
  
sides' input.  Since we ordinarily do not scrutinize district 
courts' subject matter jurisdiction remand decisions for 
substantive error, it is critically important that we preserve 
the prophylactic requirement that the court hear first from the 
parties before remanding.  Indeed, providing notice and an 
opportunity to be heard may even reduce delays, for by reducing 
the chances of erroneous remands, this rule makes it less likely 
that parties will need to remove actions more than once (where 
the time period permits) in order to use a subsequent removal 
notice to explain the governing law to the district court. 
 This construction of 1447(c) is also consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent on reviewability of remand orders.  In 
Thermtron, the district court had entered an order to show cause 
as to why the case should not be remanded and the parties had 
responded to that order.  See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 339-40, 96 
S. Ct. at 587.  In Gravitt, 430 U.S. at 723, 97 S. Ct. at 1439, 
the district court had afforded the removing defendant an 
opportunity to be heard before granting the plaintiff's remand 
motion.  See 416 F. Supp. 830, 831 & n.2 (1976). 
  
 E.  Summary 
 In conclusion, the Supreme Court early on held that 
remands under the 1875 forerunner of section 1447(c) required 
that the affected parties first be given notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.  Nothing in the subsequent development 
of the remand provision was intended to abolish this requirement, 
which does not conflict with section 1447(d)'s underlying policy 
of avoiding delay.  I must therefore disagree with the majority 
that section 1447(c) authorized the district court to remand 
without first allowing Liberty Mutual to respond to Ward 
Trucking's remand motion. 
 
II.  § 1447(d) AND REVIEWABILITY OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S REMAND ORDER 
 Because the district court failed to provide Liberty 
Mutual an opportunity to be heard before remanding, its remand 
order was unauthorized.  As a result, under our remand 
reviewability jurisprudence, section 1447(d) does not prevent us 
from issuing a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to 
remain within the bounds of its authority by awaiting Liberty 
Mutual's response to Ward Trucking's remand order.  I elaborate 
on these points as follows. 
  
 A.  Reviewability of Procedurally Unauthorized Remand Orders 
 Our opinion in Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 
(3d Cir. 1989), dictates the conclusion that remand orders 
entered in a manner not authorized by section 1447(c) are 
reviewable despite the limitations in section 1447(d).  In Air-
Shields, the district court sua sponte remanded a case that it 
concluded had been filed untimely and without a required surety 
bond.  Id. at 64-65.  Because we determined that section 1447(c) 
would not have allowed the district court to remand for these 
procedural defects outside thirty days from the filing period,15 
id. at 65, we concluded that by doing so "the district court 
exceeded its statutorily defined power," id. at 66 (quoting 
Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351, 96 S. Ct. at 593) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Thus, we were not barred by section 1447(d) from 
issuing a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate 
its remand order.  Id. 
 The situation here is analogous.  Since, as I have 
shown, notice and an opportunity to be heard before remand are 
"essential to action under . . . § 1447(c), then the lack 
[thereof] deprives a district judge of power to return a case to 
state court."  Continental Casualty Co., 29 F.3d at 294.  By 
granting Ward Trucking's motion to remand without allowing 
Liberty Mutual to respond, the district court here exceeded its 
                     
15
.  We did not decide whether the district court was ever 
permitted to remand for defect in removal procedure absent a 
motion by a party.  See id. at 65. 
  
statutorily defined power.  I of course agree with the majority 
that "only remand orders issued under § 1447(c) and invoking the 
grounds specified therein . . . are immune from review under 
§ 1447(d)."  Maj. Op. at 8 (quoting Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 346, 
96 S. Ct. at 590) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis 
supplied here).  But the district court's failure to give Liberty 
Mutual notice and opportunity to be heard precluded this from 
constituting a "remand order issued under § 1447(c)." 
 B.  Unauthorized Action or Unreviewable Error 
 While the majority does not address the Air-Shields 
analysis, it responds to Liberty Mutual's arguments by attacking 
the construction of section 1447(c) discussed above, accusing 
Liberty Mutual of "equat[ing] error with unauthorized action."  
Maj. Op. at 21.  This remonstration, however, is misdirected. 
 The section 1447(c) requirement that district courts 
hear from the parties before remanding does not, as the majority 
believes, dictate that "every erroneous remand decision would be 
reviewable."  Id.  Rather, since the district court's authority 
to remand a removed case extends to all situations where it finds 
a lack of subject matter jurisdiction after allowing the parties 
notice and an opportunity to be heard, the courts of appeals 
would review only those decisions where the district court fails 
to listen to the parties before remanding.  If the court receives 
argument from each side before acting yet still remands for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, review would generally be 
  
unavailable, regardless of how erroneous the court may have been 
in its jurisdictional determination. 
 Indeed, the majority is itself guilty of conflating 
error with unauthorized action.  I agree that Thermtron and 
Gravitt teach that "when a district court exercises its power to 
remand under section 1447(c), section 1447(d) allows a district 
court to err."  Id.  However, it does not as a matter of logic 
"necessarily follow[] that section 1447(d) also allows a district 
court to be procedurally unfair."  Id.  The majority's deduction 
would be sound only if procedural unfairness were merely one more 
form of error.  But that cannot be, for to so hold would 
undermine the legitimacy of our procedural system.  Procedural 
fairness is the predicate of legitimacy.  And since 
(concomitantly) section 1447(c) does not authorize judges to 
remand without hearing from the parties, a district court does 
not exercise "its power to remand under section 1447(c)" when it 
remands as the district court did here, for it possesses no such 
power.  Such conduct would not then be an "error" permitted to 
stand by section 1447(d) any more than would be the remand at 
issue in Thermtron, which was entered for docket control reasons; 
both actions are ultra vires. 
 The majority's reasoning is therefore either circular 
or inconsistent with Thermtron.  The majority's confident 
assertion that "[j]ust as section 1447(d) prohibits our review of 
the merits of a remand order that falls within the parameters of 
  
section 1447(c), it prohibits our review of the manner by which 
such an order is rendered," id. (emphasis supplied), begs the 
question:  Does a remand entered without hearing from the 
removing party "fall within" section 1447(c)?  Since, as I have 
argued, it does not, section 1447(d) is no bar to our review. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 I believe that the majority errs in construing section 
1447(c) to authorize district courts to issue remand orders 
without giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.  
Fortunately, the damage this holding does to remand jurisprudence 
may in time prove to be circumscribed, for nothing in the 
majority's opinion today requires district courts to engage in 
this constitutionally dubious practice.16  Courts might never 
need to address this question if district courts would in the 
future give the notice and opportunity to be heard of which I 
have spoken.  This would not undermine section 1447's policy of 
delay avoidance because, unless the district court desires to 
extend it, the substantive remand ruling can be made without 
elaborate filings or procedures. 
 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                     
16
.  It remains an open question whether such conduct violates 
the Due Process Clause, for Liberty Mutual has not brought a 
constitutional challenge. 
